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THE GEOGRAPHY AND IDEOLOGY 
OF ACCOUNTING: A CASE STUDY OF 
DOMINATION AND ACCOUNTING IN A 
SUGAR REFINERY IN AUSTRALASIA, 
1900-1920
Abstract: This historical case study examines accounting in a sugar 
refinery from 1900 to 1920 in two arenas of operation. The geography 
of accounting enabled the workers at  Chelsea to have their working 
experience sequestered by the company. Accounting  routinized their 
work at the refinery, enabling their labor to become monitored, empty 
of  meaning, and, at times, overwhelming. The ideology of accounting 
provided the company  with an instrument of evasion to silence the 
voice of labor and an instrument of self-deception designed to jus-
tify and insulate the authoritarian hierarchy of the company and  the 
power of its Australian general manager, Edward Knox. Accounting 
became an  ideology that sought to legitimate the exploitation of the 
workforce and the generous return to shareholders. 
INTRODUCTION
 This case study describes and interprets accounting prac-
tices situated in the New Zealand branch of an Australian com-
pany, the Colonial Sugar Refinery (CSR). Known as Chelsea sug-
ar refinery and located in the Auckland suburb of Birkenhead, 
the New Zealand company was started by Australian and New 
Zealand investors in 1883. This historical study examines ac-
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counting in the company from 1900 to 1920, particularly the use 
of accounting as a tool of domination. We examine this domi-
nation in two dimensions – the geography and the ideology of 
accounting. We explore the geography or locale of accounting in 
terms of the physical distance between the head office (Sydney) 
and Auckland and at the level of production locally at the Chel-
sea refinery. The accounting records enabled an autocratic and 
authoritarian leader to control the branch with vigorous surveil-
lance from Australia. The Australian head office was unwilling 
to delegate any significant influence to the managers of the 
branch company. Decision authority was, therefore, effectively 
based in Australia, and any semblance of delegated authority 
was in form rather than substance. The geography/locale of ac-
counting at Chelsea enabled the workers to have their working 
experience sequestered by the company [Giddens, 1991, p 149]. 
Accounting routinized their work at the refinery, enabling their 
labor to become monitored, empty of meaning, and, at times, 
overwhelming. It was only when crises or fateful moments [Gid-
dens, 1991, p. 202], such as on-the-job accidents or union activ-
ity, introduced a moral reckoning that the accounting regime of 
truth [Foucault, 1980] created around the labor process was dis-
rupted. Labor and production processes provided the location 
for accounting to control and monitor the labor force, known as 
“wage labour.” It also provided the opportunity for labor to col-
lectively reappropriate its closely monitored existence.
 The ideology of accounting provided the company with an 
instrument of evasion to silence the voice of labor and became 
an instrument of self-deception designed to justify and insulate 
the authoritarian hierarchy of the company and the power of 
its Australian general manager, Edward Knox (EK) [Volf, 1996]. 
Accounting became an ideology that sought to legitimate the 
exploitation of the workforce and the generous return to share-
holders and played a key role in advancing the particular inter-
ests of Knox and facilitating domination.
 Based on the two dimensions, this paper aims to examine 
the broader narratives in which the accounting numbers were 
placed. These accounting-based narratives enabled the auto-
cratic control and surveillance of the labor force to be carried 
out with a semblance of objectivity which sought to diffuse its 
contested nature. The narratives created a regime of truth that 
not only justified the way the workforce was deployed and man-
aged under the hubris of efficiency but also enabled the more 
powerful narrative of shareholder returns. In the end, the ac-
counting-based narratives presented by the company assumed 
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it could melt the differing points of view of labor opposition 
into the common currency of a single truth [Volf, 1996, p. 241]. 
The accounting truth presented by the company served to legiti-
mate the particular company interests of CSR and privilege the 
autocracy of Edward William Knox (EWK) and his fellow share-
holders.
 The study has benefited from a rich archive1 of narrative 
material made up of letters and memoranda as well as account-
ing information. This information forms the basis of the paper 
which is organized as follows. First, the organizational context 
is described in terms of the company, the town, and the sugar 
process. The next section discusses the theoretical lenses in-
forming the narrative of the paper. This is followed by a study of 
two dimensions of domination – the geography and the ideology 
of accounting. Findings are summarized in the conclusion.
ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
 Accounting research on the sugar industry has concentrated 
on the labor processes and relations in the agricultural sector. 
During 1850 to 1920, a wide variety of labor relations were used 
around the world in field production. Sugar refineries received 
raw material from agriculturalists ranging from the primitive 
to the sophisticated. Labor relations included tenant-farmers, 
sharecroppers, and peasant farmers as well as commercialized, 
agrarian entrepreneurs and seigniorial estates [Bosma and 
Knight, 2004, pp. 12-13]. Fleischman and Tyson [2000] exam-
ined how accounting was involved in the racial segmentation of 
the workforce on Hawaiian sugar plantations.2 The sugar refin-
ery, on the other hand, experienced considerable convergence in 
its production processes by the early 1900s. CSR itself exhibited 
this difference between field and factory. CSR had sugar planta-
tions in Queensland and Fiji with differing labor characteristics; 
yet, their sugar refineries were similar in terms of the produc-
tion processes. 
1The Chelsea sugar refinery archive is housed at the Takapuna Public Li-
brary, Auckland, New Zealand. Archival material is referenced by box number. 
The boxed archives of letters, memoranda, schedules, etc. are primary archives, 
separate and distinct from the “Research Notes on the Chelsea Sugar Works” of 
Watson [1979]. 
2For further discussion, see Burrows [2002] and Fleischman and Tyson 
[2002]. We did not identify any racial issues at Chelsea sugar refinery. Before the 
late 1930s, Chelsea was a totally masculine community of New Zealanders and a 
large British contingent [Luke, 1984].
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The Company: EK and nine entrepreneurial shareholders 
founded the CSR on January 1, 1855, with a capital of £150,000. 
EK was experienced in the sugar industry having previously 
managed the Australasian Sugar Company until its dissolution 
in 1854. The company initially carried large amounts of debt but 
began to prosper in the 1870s after the establishment of its own 
sugar cane plantations and several mills on the northern rivers 
of New South Wales, Australia. EK’s son, EWK, was involved 
with the company from the age of 17 and in 1880, when he was 
35 years of age, the management of the business was passed to 
him. EK (chairman of the board) visited New Zealand in 1881 
and purchased 160 acres of coastal land for the building of a 
sugar refinery. Two years later, CSR and the Victoria Sugar Com-
pany (an associated company of CSR) formed the New Zealand 
Sugar Company (commonly referred to as Chelsea sugar refin-
ery), each entity holding one-third of the £300,000 authorized 
capital, with the remaining third held by high-profile New Zea-
land investors. Prior to the opening of the New Zealand refinery, 
the bulk of New Zealand’s refined sugar was supplied by the 
Australian CSR refineries. From the beginning, the new refinery 
produced sufficient sugar for New Zealand’s needs, so imports 
of refined sugar ceased. However, despite its monopoly position, 
the company failed to make profits for the first four years, and, 
by the end of 1887, the New Zealand Sugar Company was insol-
vent and was collapsed into CSR.
 CSR was a single-product company. Sugar was increasingly 
being used in food processing, particularly in preservation and 
pickling. CSR’s key strategy was to control the market and, by 
1915, it controlled 90% of the refined sugar production in Aus-
tralia and 100% in New Zealand. CSR dominated the market by 
underselling its competitors. At times it undersold competitors 
by 5 shillings per ton [Griggs, 2001, p. 368]. In 1893, CSR dis-
missed a suggestion from its competitor, the Australasia Sugar 
Refinery Company, to make a deal with CSR over New Zealand 
prices and market share. Under no circumstances was CSR go-
ing to give up its complete dominance of the New Zealand mar-
ket. CSR also denied competitors outlets for their refined sugar. 
It had exclusive agreements with wholesalers and threatened 
them with the loss of their agency if they did not remain loyal. 
The underselling strategy even eliminated merchants who were 
importing overseas-produced, refined white sugar. By 1912, 
EWK admitted to controlling the price of sugar in Australia 
[Griggs, 2001, p. 372]. Griggs [2001, p. 373] comments that “this 
control enabled CSR to achieve handsome profits; it had paid 
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annual dividends (plus bonuses) in the order of 15% on sub-
scribed capital during the 1900s.” This philosophy of domina-
tion of the sugar market spilled over into how the company was 
managed.
The Town: A sugar town soon developed around the hub of the 
refinery. The refinery was the only real employment in the area 
– “the sugar works was the biggest employer. . . . There was no 
other place” [unknown interviewee, quoted in Luke, 1984]. 
The town initially consisted of roughly built shanties. In 1884, 
the company built a barracks for single men and a number of 
workers’ cottages. The cottages were cold and damp. Despite 
the cheap rent, most of them were unoccupied by 1890. They 
were condemned by health authorities in 1905, and four brick 
duplexes were built on the site of the old village. These were oc-
cupied by the managers while many of the single workers lived 
in a boarding house by the ferry wharf. The company refused to 
put in septic tanks to alleviate the sanitary problem in the town. 
Closets under the wharf used by workers would not be attended 
to “until pressure is brought to bear” on the company by the 
Department of Health [EWK to Auckland, 2/8/1905, box 151]. 
Young men progressed from school to the refinery at age 12. 
Often all the males in a family, father and sons, worked there. 
When the sons left home, they often married into another sugar 
family and merely shifted residence to another street in the sug-
ar town [unknown interviewee, quoted in Luke, 1984]. Smoke 
from the refinery pervaded the town and discolored the washing. 
The Sugar Process:
Oh in the Stonegut Sugar Works
The floors are black with grime
As I found out when I worked there
Among the dirt and slime;
I think they must have built it
In Queen Victoria’s time.
I had the job of hosing down
The hoick and sludge and grit
For the sweet grains of sugar dust
That had been lost in it
For the Company to boil again
And put it on your plate;
[Baxter, 1972]
 These are two stanzas from a poem entitled Ballad of the 
Stonegut Sugar Works by James K. Baxter (1926-1972), one 
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of New Zealand’s most famous poets. He worked at the sugar 
refinery in the 1960s and wrote this poem about his working 
experiences even though he only lasted three weeks at the refin-
ery. Despite his reflections being about working conditions in 
the 1960s, the poem provides a poignant insight into the tough 
working conditions of the Chelsea sugar refinery. 
 In the early 1900s, raw sugar came to the New Zealand 
refinery by ship from Java, Cuba, and Peru. Each ship carried 
about 15,000 tons of bagged raw sugar. Gangs of wharf hands 
unloaded the ships and stacked the bags in the raw store after 
weighing. Even at this level of operation, there was a hierarchy 
of jobs starting with the workers who pushed the empty trucks 
out of the shed. The next level was the “hooking on” which in-
volved attaching clips to the sugar bags so they could be hoisted 
up onto a stack. Stackers formed the third level in the hierarchy. 
This job was prestigious as it required specific attention to en-
sure that the stacks of sugar bags were straight and stable. The 
easiest job, driving the jiggers, was usually reserved for older, 
long-term employees who could no longer cope with the rigor of 
the other tasks [Frank Schorman, quoted in Watson, 1979, p. 8].
 The first stage of the refining process involved slitting the 
throat of the bags and pouring the raw sugar down through 
gratings for transporting to hoppers. Large wooden mallets were 
used to break up rock-hard raw sugar. Raw sugar consists of 
about 98% sucrose surrounded by a film of syrup which contains 
most of the non-sucrose constituents. All non-sucrose constitu-
ents have to be removed in order to obtain quality white sugar 
granules. This is the primary task of a refinery. The raw sugar 
was “washed” in hot water in high-speed centrifugal machines 
to remove the syrup film from around the sucrose crystals. The 
wash house consisted of huge tanks, ten feet long and six feet 
wide, in which jelly bags were suspended. The liquor (syrup) 
was filtered through these bags. Four or five workers would 
stand in the tank to wash out the muck-filled filter bags. They 
wore only a piece of filter cloth tied around their waists [Stan 
Cross, quoted in Watson, 1979, p. 9]. Most sugar workers agreed 
that this was the worst job in the refinery [Watson, 1979, p. 10]. 
The clear, filtered liquor was then passed over bone charcoal to 
remove color impurities. Every so often the charcoal had to be 
re-burnt in ovens heated to 1100-1200°F to restore its filtering 
capabilities. The re-burnt char was dragged out with long, rake-
like poles. The men worked in extreme heat among clouds of 
fine dust. Stan Luker thought that no human being should ever 
have been asked to do this sort of job [Watson, 1979, p.10]. 
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 The purified liquor then went to the vacuum pans. “Sugar 
boiling” was a specialized job producing pure refined sugar. 
The contents of the pans were dropped down into cooling vats, 
and then the crystals of refined sugar were separated from the 
liquor by spinning in centrifugal machines. The resulting refined 
sugar crystals were dried, graded, and bagged. Twenty to 30 men 
packed the 70 and 140-pound bags in what was described as an 
incredibly noisy environment, “. . . all day and every day the same 
thing. Rattling away, clang, clang, clang. . . . It’d drive you round 
the bend. I reckon half them were insane that worked that job” 
[Curly Mayall, quoted in Watson, 1979, p. 11]. 
And though along those slippery floors
A man might break a leg
And the foul stink of Diesel fumes
Flow through the packing shed
And men in clouds of char dust move 
Like the animated dead, 
[Baxter, 1972]
 Other workers operated sewing machines to stitch the top of 
filled bags, to make new bags, or repair old bags. Clerical duties 
included the tally clerk who counted up to 12,000 bags in an 8-
hour day. 
But the Clerk and the Slavedriver
Are birds of another kind,
For the clerk sits in his high glass cage
With money on his mind, 
And the slavedriver down below
Can’t call a slave a friend
Instead they have (or nearly all)
The Company for a wife,
A strange kind of bedmate
That sucks away their life
On a little mad dirt track
Of chiselling and strife
[Baxter, 1972]
THEORETICAL LENSES
 Domination is a form of exclusion [Volf, 1996, p. 75]. “Wage 
labour” at Chelsea was assigned by EWK and the management 
of CSR to a place of inferior status and was subjugated for the 
sake of shareholder wealth. Accounting helped EWK colonize 
Chelsea so he could dominate and control. This is where Michel 
Foucault’s work provides insight into accounting. Accounting 
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becomes what Foucault [1979] calls a disciplinary mechanism. 
Accounting’s power is in its subtlety. EWK realized that CSR 
was “stretched over large tracts of time-space” and that his per-
sonalized, monarchic-like control depended on high “presence-
availability” which he realized was diffused [Giddens, 1987, 
p. 164]. Accounting provided a solution. Disciplinary power 
works through surveillance mechanisms such as accounting as 
opposed to threats of “exemplary power” of violence charac-
teristic of previous ages [Foucault, 1979]. Accounting creates 
visibilities within the organization and produces a “truth” about 
the organization. Foucault [1980, p. 118] insists that truth is 
produced rather than disclosed or discovered. He is interested 
in “seeing historically how the effects of truth are produced 
within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor 
false.” Volf [1996, p. 245] comments, “the significant question 
is not so much what is the case, but why and how is something 
proclaimed and believed to be the case.”
 Foucault’s “regime of truth” captures an additional insight 
which is the association of truth and power. To produce truth 
and sustain it, “multiple forms of constraint” are needed [Fou-
cault, 1980, p. 131]. To have constraint, you need to have organi-
zational power [Volf, p. 246]. EWK was a powerful, autocratic 
presence in CSR. Accounting extended and reinforced his power. 
Accounting became a “regime of truth” that gave even more 
power to the already powerful Knox. CSR’s accounting narrative 
reinforced his monarchic power, operating at a distance and 
becoming an administrative power at the locale of the Chelsea 
branch.
 Giddens provides some insightful ideas for understanding 
how organizations like the Chelsea refinery regionalize time 
and space. He suggests sequestration is the “most pronounced 
form of time-space zoning,” and its effect is to “radically alter 
the nature of day to day experience” [Giddens, 1987, p. 151]. 
The Chelsea refinery became a place of concealment for the 
wage laborers. Once they stepped through the factory gate, 
their existence became closely monitored and controlled. The 
laborers’ lives were sequestered from their existence outside of 
the refinery into a world of surveillance enabled by the admin-
istrative/disciplinary power of accounting. The refinery became 
an architecture of power not only in the sense of the physical 
setting/layout of the refinery but also in the way that setting and 
social conduct interact to generate administrative/disciplinary 
power [Giddens, 1987, p. 159]. The specific locale of the Chelsea 
refinery permitted a consolidation of accounting at the top of the 
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organizational hierarchy in Auckland, enabling EWK to exercise 
his patrimonial means of domination over CSR. The geography 
and ideology of accounting are heuristic descriptors that seek to 
convey the insights provided by these theoretical lenses.
ACCOUNTING FACILITATES DOMINATION
The First Dimension – the Geography of Accounting: Account-
ing facilitated the exercise of management’s power and was an 
instrument for controlling workers from a distance [Riccaboni 
et al., 2006]. The physical distance between factory and decision 
maker (EWK), combined with EWK’s autocratic characteristics, 
required large amounts of information be sent to the head of-
fice in order that he could control day-to-day operations from 
afar. Not only did accounting facilitate a general, administrative 
power but also the personal, monarchic power of EWK. The ge-
ography of accounting first examines this distance between the 
head office in Sydney and the branch in Auckland and, second, 
the locale of the sugar production at the Chelsea refinery.
 EWK, the son of the founder, became general manager in 
1880 and for 40 years controlled the company. According to 
Maynagh [1981, pp. 27-28], Knox was an austere, single-minded 
man apparently lacking in humor and having few outside in-
terests. He demanded hard work and honesty and, above all, a 
dedication to the company. Loyalty was a distinctive feature of 
CSR with children of longtime workers given jobs and length of 
service seen as a principal quality for job advancement. This ap-
proach perpetuated a conservative and paternalistic approach in 
managerial appointments.
 Birch and Blaxland [1956, p. 26] describe EWK as a 
“…somewhat impetuous and autocratic general manager. . . . He 
was not disposed to let his officers assume they were his equals 
when it came to a decision.” The Colonial Office in Fiji described 
Knox as “a peppery aristocrat” and “an irascible autocrat of 75, 
notorious for his methods of dealing with strikers and business 
opponents” [Maynagh, 1981, p. 104]. Knox, as a free-trade sup-
porter, strongly opposed government involvement in commerce 
and industry [Lowndes, 1956].
 Lyle [1957, p. 538] outlines the importance of analyzing the 
sugar production process and creating visibilities around that 
process. Lyle points out that the figures analyzing production 
give control and direction to the business so that “[the man-
ager] will always be able to carry out the detailed economy or 
 efficiency crusades which form an essential part in keeping a 
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factory…up to the mark.” Weekly production reports were sent 
from Chelsea to Sydney via the Auckland Office. These reports 
detailed the stocks of refined sugar packed, melted, and deliv-
ered on a per-ton basis and included fine detail of costs recorded 
on a day-to-day basis. The reports were standardized across 
CSR’s sugar refineries so as to facilitate comparisons. The weekly 
reports also monitored stocks of raw sugar received and melted 
as well as details of hessian cloth and bags, coke, coal, syrup, 
and molasses [Chelsea Refinery Production Schedule, 8/2/1896, 
box 159]. These reports were accompanied by a letter from the 
refinery manager, Mr. Miller, to the general manager in Sydney, 
EWK. The weekly letter outlined refinery issues (supplies of raw 
sugar and weekly production) as well as issues regarding the 
workforce and machinery.
 Every six months, Sydney sent the half-yearly accounts of 
the New Zealand branch to Auckland. Accounts included stock 
on hand, sundry expenses, refined sugar sales, and schedules 
of balances and expenses. The accounts were accompanied by 
two key statements which compared “sugar house wages” and 
the “cost of manufacture” across the company’s five sugar re-
fineries of Pyrmont (Sydney), Yarraville (Melbourne), Glanville 
(Queensland), New Farm (Queensland), and, of course, Chelsea 
[e.g., 31/3/1903, box 125]. Sometimes Sydney questioned the ac-
curacy of the accounting information sent. EWK, for example, 
questioned why the tons of refined sugar made did not equal 
the total on the chemical return by 107 tons. He even suggested 
that the error seemed to have been made in the March quarter 
[EWK to Auckland, 10/5/1911, box 152]. Other times EWK 
wanted further explanations of numbers submitted to Sydney. 
He insisted that “we should be fully informed of the work which 
this payment represents. . . . In cases of this kind, where abnor-
mal expenditure is incurred, we expect explanations to be fur-
nished without application from us” [Head Office to Auckland, 
29/3/1910, box 150]. Knox wanted the returns to the head office 
to be detailed, breaking out items such as the cost of making 
filter bags from the cost of repairing them [Head Office to Auck-
land, 25/5/1904, box 154]. 
 The comparative statements enabled Knox to exercise sig-
nificant surveillance. Knox used the Pyrmont refinery and other 
Australian refineries as a quasi-standard to monitor and control 
the Auckland branch at a distance. In 1908, Miller (New Zealand 
manager) replied to questions about production quality based 
on these comparatives. He suggested that the quality of the 
sugar produced was different from Pyrmont due to the polariza-
10
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tion of the raw sugars and, perhaps, the use of lime at the mills. 
He further stated that the quality of the char was another vari-
able in its removal of ash and fruit sugars [Auckland to Sydney, 
1/2/1908, box 145]. In 1909, EWK again compared Chelsea to 
Pyrmont observing, “…there has been a steady – almost continu-
ous – increase in expenses, and the greater rate of work last half 
has not reduced the wages per ton of sugar…Considering that 
you have no charge for water, and that the delivery of refined 
sugar costs much less with you than in Sydney or Melbourne 
your figures do not show well alongside those for the other 
houses, namely Pyrmont and Yarraville” [EWK to Auckland, 
28/4/1909, box 151]. Wastage was constantly monitored by EWK 
who noted that the loss of 1.49% cane sugar was 0.30% above 
the average of all refineries [EWK to Auckland, 25/10/1916, box 
158]. 
 CSR was shareholder focused; “they do not forget the results 
which must be achieved for their ultimate employers, the twelve 
thousand shareholders” [Lowndes, 1956, p. 349]. Knox objected 
to the Australian government investigating the sugar industry 
and was pleased in 1912 when a Sugar Commission recom-
mended against the nationalization of the refining trade and 
for price controls on sugar cane and refined sugar. He describes 
such ideas as “old socialistic schemes.” He was disappointed 
when the Commission questioned CSR’s accounting data regard-
ing refining profits by suggesting that “concealment of profits” 
may occur at CSR [Memorandum, 20/12/1912, box 125]. Strate-
gies, such as the refusal to pay for overtime worked, provided a 
source of unpaid labor. The aim was to obtain the highest rate 
of return on the Australian investment by forcing “maximum 
surplus” from the factory workers [Tyson et al., 2004].
 The second locale of accounting was at the Chelsea refin-
ery. Accounting was implicated in the sequestration [Giddens, 
1991] of the workers’ experience in the sugar refinery and in 
the development of a regime of truth [Foucault, 1980] to ensure 
surveillance and control by the company’s omniscient manager 
(EWK) and his representative at Chelsea, E.V. Miller, manager 
of the refinery from 1884 to 1920. Accounting enabled seques-
tration of the workers by enclosing the refinery’s space through 
organization and order and by extracting more moments of time 
for productive use [Giddens, 1991]. An unknown interviewee 
[Luke, 1984] states that it was not until the 1940s that New 
Zealanders started rising through the company hierarchy. Prior 
to that time, the managers and the bosses were nearly always 
Australians who kept to themselves. All the senior positions 
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were held by Australians – manager, chemists, chief engineer. 
Directors, managers, and auditors visited frequently from Aus-
tralia. “The people running it were frightened of Sydney. They 
were definitely frightened of Sydney, of Head Office” [Charlie 
Castleton, quoted in Watson, 1979, p. 24]. The autocratic man-
agement style of EWK was perpetuated by Miller at Chelsea, 
who considered himself an omnipotent presence as indicated 
by his correspondence with EWK and the Sydney head office. 
“He’d been known to fire men for misbehaviour even when they 
weren’t at work” [Curly Mayall, quoted in Watson, 1979]. “He 
ruled the men at work and when they were away too” [workers, 
quoted in Watson, 1979, p. 24]. 
You will guess I got the bullet,
And it was no surprise,
For the chemists from their cages 
Looked down with vulture eyes
To see if they could spot a man
Buttoning up his flies.
It’s hard to take your pay and go
Up the winding road
Because you speak to your brother man
And keep your head unbowed,
In a place where the dismal stink of fear
Hangs heavy as a cloud.
[Baxter, 1972]
 The Chelsea sugar refinery provides us with an example of 
an organization in which factory-floor workers and subordinate 
management were tightly monitored and controlled in an organi-
zational structure imposing a formal bureaucratic hierarchy 
[Whitley, 1999]. Management was controlled by formal rules 
and procedures and tight budgets which limited its discretion 
in choosing appropriate strategies for day-to-day operation of 
the factory. Factory workers were tightly supervised to prevent 
the possibility of opportunistic behavior in the form of extended 
tea or toilet breaks. Local management and supervisors appear 
to have been concerned with the welfare of workers only to the 
extent of the possible impact on workplace productivity [Sarava-
namuthu and Tinker, 2003]. This lack of concern caused workers 
to feel that they were just pairs of hands, numbers, and costs to 
be minimized in order to produce profits for others. 
 The detailed accounting systems provided the basis for 
company activities and decisions. The power of this information 
fostered the autocratic management style of Knox and provided 
a structure of dominance from the head office. This accounting-
12
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based dominance acted as “a governance instrument for control-
ling workers at a distance” [Riccaboni et al., 2006] and served to 
legitimize the sometimes ruthless actions of management. Chel-
sea provided a specific geography or locale for accounting to be 
a key component in sequestering the workers’ experience. The 
sentiments expressed in Watson [1979] indicate that the men 
perceived that the accounting records were the “eyes of the com-
pany” [Kaplan, 1984, p. 392], eyes that were always on them. 
Giddens notes that institutions like the factory significantly alter 
the nature of day-to-day experience [1987, p. 151]. This was 
the case for the Chelsea wage laborers. Accounting was used to 
discipline the workers to ensure profitable outcomes for EWK 
and his fellow shareholders. Accounting provided him and his 
managers with an architecture of power. Accounting facilitated 
the exercise of EWK’s personal, monarchic power and created 
an autonomous, administrative power which took on a life of its 
own. What started as EWK’s obsession for information became 
an administrative structure. Accounting objectified and shaped 
beliefs held about Chelsea by management and workers.
The Second Dimension – Accounting Ideology: This second di-
mension of domination describes the use of accounting ideology 
as a manifestation of power and control. Burchell et al. [1985] 
suggest that accounting information has an ideological function 
in that it is used to legitimize particular activities or rational-
ize behavior. In this sense, ideology has a key role in the use of 
accounting to advance particular interests and can be part of 
the process of maintaining domination [Thompson, 1984]. In 
the case of CSR, the ideology of accounting points to it as an 
instrument of evasion used to silence the voice of labor and an 
instrument of self-deception designed to justify the authoritar-
ian hierarchy of the company and the power of EWK. EWK had 
a perception of the average worker, of his own role, his respon-
sibility to shareholders, and the nature and role of business, 
government, and unions. This set of beliefs led him to use the 
information he gathered to control the lives of his employees. 
In addition, EWK used accounting information to make sure 
that the distribution of wealth met his expectations. When faced 
with a change in labor rates, he instituted compensating cuts 
elsewhere to ensure the overall distribution was unchanged. He 
acted to maintain status quo wealth distribution and to punish 
those who opposed him. When threatened, EWK used account-
ing information to support his position, to provide incentives, or 
to punish.
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 The working environment of the refinery was extremely hot, 
noisy, dusty, and dirty [Watson, 1979]. Every process was carried 
out with heated sugar solutions with the heat supplied by steam. 
The work involved three shifts a day (24 hours) from Monday to 
Saturday morning. The company did not allow the men morning 
and afternoon tea breaks. Toilet breaks were monitored:
When the head chemist came to me 
Dressed in his white coat
I thought he might give me a medal
For I had a swollen foot
Got by shovelling rock-hard sugar
Down a dirty chute.
But no: ‘I hear your work’s all right,’
The chemist said to me,
‘But you took seven minutes
To go to the lavatory;
I timed it with my little watch
My mother gave to me.’ 
[Baxter, 1972]
 There was an envelope of control around the employees, 
facilitated by accounting information which was an important 
power resource [Pettigrew, 1972; see also, Roberts and Scap-
ens, 1985]. The accounting records were detailed around the 
production process. The labor records enabled the head office 
in Australia to rule with an unusual intensity and glare. EWK 
used these detailed accounting records to create a regime of 
truth around the production process so he could justify his 
hard stance on wage rates and conditions. The weekly letter to 
the head office from Auckland outlined weekly production with 
comments made on all aspects of Chelsea’s operations, particu-
larly changes in the workforce. The six-monthly report included 
detailed individual wage information for each employee broken 
down by employee task. The age, hours per week worked, wages 
per week, and length of service were recorded for each employee 
as well as whether the worker was paid on contract basis or un-
der an Employee Arbitration Court award. The performance of 
the Chelsea labor force was constantly compared to that of the 
Australian Pyrmont and Yarraville plants which became de facto 
standards for Chelsea. Chelsea’s report was inserted into a com-
parative wages report for all the company’s refineries organized 
around major employee functions in the production process. 
Computations showed total wages per occupation and the rate 
of wages paid per ton of sugar melted. The Chelsea factory was 
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under constant surveillance, organizational behavior was tightly 
prescribed and controlled, and workers were closely monitored. 
In 1906, EWK noted that the cause of a serious loss the previ-
ous half year was due to a “system of supervision that must 
have been exceedingly lax.” He suggested that more production 
records were the answer [EWK, 23/5/1906, Box 151]. As a result, 
the gatekeeper had to report when men were late and if they left 
early for dinner or at 5 p.m. [Gatekeeper’s Duties, 19/7/1908, box 
150].
 Although wages of the refinery workers made up 28% of 
the cost of production in 1903, 21% in 1912, and 18% in 1920 
[Cost of Manufacture, 31/3/1903, box 125; 31/3/1912-30/9/1925, 
box 114], EWK used the accounting’s regime of truth to justify 
his non-negotiable approach to the workforce. The average an-
nual wage of a refinery worker in 1912 was £120 compared to 
the refinery manager’s salary of £700 and the Auckland general 
manager’s of £1,100. The accounting records produced a truth 
which EWK proclaimed as fair and true in representing CSR’s 
organizational facts, therefore legitimating his power to control 
the workforce to the benefit of the salaried Australian workforce 
in New Zealand and the primarily Australian shareholders. Fou-
cault [1980, p. 131] states that “truth is a thing of this world: it 
is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraint.” The 
accounting truth produced by CSR was used by EWK to impose 
his views of how and why the wealth produced by the company 
should be allocated the way it was.
 Domination was also sought through welfare. In 1910, CSR 
decided to offer housing loans to some employees who came to 
live near the refinery. CSR used these loans (advances) to buy 
employee loyalty and commitment. Welfare sought to gain the 
loyalty of the workforce with the appearance of employer benev-
olence [Wright, 1995, p. 21]. CSR saw welfare as good business 
to engender loyalty. EWK noted that while on occasion they may 
have a house left on their hands and a small loss “against this we 
could set the advantage of having a number of men in the neigh-
bourhood of the Works who were more or less tied to the place” 
[letter to Auckland Manager, 30/12/1910, box 150]. Over a third 
of all new houses in Birkenhead between 1910 and 1926 were fi-
nanced from CSR loans. The loans were for 25 years with “rent” 
deducted from gross wages [Luke, 1984]. Employees viewed the 
loans as a blessing and a curse. The granting of a loan imparted 
the status of permanent employee – “they wouldn’t sack you if 
you owed them money” [unidentified employee, quoted in Wat-
son, 1979]. On the other hand, workers lost the freedom to leave 
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the refinery. Teenagers began work in the bag shed: “When you 
got to 20 you used to get the sack if there were no vacancies in 
the mill itself and they would take a new boy on. They kept me 
on when I got to 20 because I was paying my father’s rent. He 
had a sugar workers’ house but he was on relief work. If they’d 
sacked me they wouldn’t have got any rent” [unidentified em-
ployee, quoted in Luke, 1984, p. 12]. Another interviewee tells of 
how he got sick, received £1 a week sick pay, but had to pay 76% 
(15/2d) in loan repayments which left his family in dire straits 
[Watson, 1979, p. 45].
 The company also formed a provident fund (retirement 
funds) and a benefit society. The provident fund ended after the 
1920 strike; contributions to date were refunded. Despite these 
welfare arrangements, interviewees [Luke, 1984] talked of the 
indifference of the company to the workforce exemplified by the 
reference to workers as “units” or by their number. “I was num-
ber 421. You go into the gates as a number, and you come out 
the gates as a number” [Stan Luker, quoted in Watson, 1979]. A 
foreman might ask: “Can I borrow a unit off you for my shift” 
[Curly Mayall, quoted in Watson, 1979]? Labor was literally seen 
as a series of numbers, a cost to be minimized in order to pro-
vide profits to shareholders. 
 By the 1900s refinery production became standardized 
around two key technologies – the vacuum pan and multiple-ef-
fect condensers. The vacuum pan enabled the sugar to be boiled 
at a lower temperature by creating a partial vacuum. These tech-
nologies enabled continuous manufacture and the pacing and 
timing of work flows. Although these processes required a small 
number of experienced workers capable of applying judgment 
in their operation, these technological developments did not 
necessarily imply the existence of a free-labor market. In fact, 
CSR tried to constrain the capacity of the workforce to bargain 
over wages by demonizing union activity and segmenting the 
workforce to weaken its bargaining ability, labeled a deprole-
tarianization of the workforce by Bosma and Knight [2004, pp. 
13-14]. The company also solicited the state to bias Arbitration 
Court rulings against the workforce by emphasizing that sugar 
was an essential commodity and employees should be punished 
for interrupting its supply [Watson, 1979, p. 23]. 
 The setting of wage rates exhibited further aspects of hier-
archical domination. New Zealand was considered a world 
leader in enacting legislation to promote harmonious industrial 
relations [Bennett, 2004, p. 60]. In 1894, the Industrial Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Act laid out a vision for industrial relations 
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that included compulsory arbitration courts and awards. Unions 
had to be registered to bring a case and agree not to strike while 
a wage award existed. This encouraged harmonious relations 
and took the sting out of any militantly aggressive unions. Wil-
liam Reeves, who drafted the legislation, suggested that the act 
would “save...labour from itself” [quoted in Bennett, 2004, p. 
58]. Labor would be “saved” in the sense that unions would be 
robust and have a process to follow for wage negotiations. This 
process was not embraced by Chelsea even though the legisla-
tion was considered enlightened and conciliatory. In 1903, some 
of the workers joined the Birkenhead Sugar Workers Union and 
took a case to the Arbitration Court. Laborers were awarded a 
reduction in hours from 54 to 48 for 42/- plus overtime of 1/1d 
per hour for six hours [memorandum, Auckland Arbitration 
Award, 1903, box 151]. This amounted to an effective increase 
of about 15%. Wages for boys were likewise increased. EWK 
had an uncompromising attitude towards unions. He did not 
appreciate being dictated to and was outright hostile towards 
workers who formed unions to negotiate wages and better work-
ing conditions. The company labeled union officials Moscow 
internationalists or Independent Workers of the World (IWW), 
a labor movement established in Chicago in 1905 whose motto 
was “the world’s wealth for the world’s workers.”
 In 1903, the company dismissed the union secretary after 
the first wage award was granted by the Arbitration Court [1903, 
box 151]. In addition, Knox dismissed 115 men from the provi-
dent fund so he could use the contributions the company made 
on behalf of those employees (£258) to offset the increased 
costs of wages because of the new award. The company had 
employed this tactic before in 1894 when the Factories Act was 
passed, and it became illegal to pay boys off before a holiday of 
which there were only two. The cost of paying the extra day to 
16 boys was taken off the picnic fund “because in this way the 
men would suffer and it is they not the boys who are responsible 
for the law making” [Miller to Auckland, 27/11/1894, box 145]. 
EWK also refused to employ boys once they reached 19 so as 
to avoid paying higher award wages. He threatened to cut back 
production at Chelsea if the award increased the cost of work. 
He was more sanguine about cutting employees out of the Em-
ployee Benefit Society because it had implications for increased 
accident insurance [memorandum, Auckland Arbitration Award, 
1903, box 151]. EWK’s vindictive approach over the wage award 
is illustrated by his treatment of a watchman at Chelsea named 
Hatfield. Knox [letter to Auckland, 21/1/1903, box 151] states:
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the Award of the Court has altered our position regard-
ing this man, and he cannot expect any retiring allow-
ance or pension. The rate of wage fixed is so high that a 
much more active man must be employed. Now that the 
men have seen fit to appeal to the Court, they must be 
prepared to submit to their decision, and they need not 
look to us to go out of our way to assist those who are 
not fit either for work or to earn the wages laid down in 
the schedule.
EWK went on to state that even men with long service “who 
cannot keep up to the faster stroke made necessary under the 
finding of the Arbitration Court” can no longer be employed 
[EWK to Auckland, 28/1/1903, box 151]. For EWK higher wages 
brought an expectation of greater productivity.
 At the same time, EWK suggested that Auckland manage-
ment consider changing employment arrangements by contract-
ing with employees in the wash house, the refined sugar fugals, 
and the refined sugar store. Using the accounting information, 
he estimated that cheaper work could be done, especially in the 
refined sugar store, although contractors would be expected to 
pay award wages. The accounting mapping of the labor process 
also suggested segmentation of work as a cost saving measure in 
response to the award. For example, loading and delivery should 
be separated from the ordinary work of the store [EWK to 
Auckland, 28/1/1903, box 151]. Further suggestions were made 
in 1904 regarding using female labor in the bag-making area 
because the women are “more handy at the sewing and handling 
of the material than the boys are.” Auckland management, how-
ever, did not think it could employ women despite the possible 
cost savings [EWK to Auckland, 25/1/1904, box 151].
 These strategies and tactics were always ready to be imple-
mented at Chelsea under the direction of EWK. CSR did not 
view compulsory arbitration as its friend and were vindictive 
whenever the employees obtained a new award. The union asked 
for more concessions in 1905, which was a further catalyst for 
EWK to assert his control over Chelsea. EWK was upset with 
the unreasonable attitude of wage-earners in New Zealand and 
was disappointed with Chelsea management for meeting with 
the union representative, Mr. Wallace. EWK asserted, “no good 
whatever can accrue from your conference with the men…and 
anyhow the decision as to the course to be followed must rest 
with me” [EWK to Auckland, 1/2/1905, box 151]. No wonder 
EWK noted a “strong feeling against the Company amongst the 
men” despite the concessions of better light and ventilation in 
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the refinery [EWK to Auckland, 19/6/1905, box 151]. 
 EWK promoted union officials as “professional agitators.” 
He would anticipate labor supply and demand in order to jus-
tify his hard-line stance against the company’s workers. EWK 
constantly compared Chelsea workers’ demands to those of the 
Australian employees, holding strongly to the idea “that the men 
working at Chelsea should not be put on a footing differing in 
any way from that of the Australian employees who certainly 
are not their inferior in capacity and probably do not live more 
cheaply” [EWK to Auckland, 25/3/1908, box 152]. He would not 
talk to any person who was not employed by the company. Cost 
of living increases asked for by the union would be dismissed 
by EWK as “the usual practice in New Zealand of paying fancy 
wages and passing the charge on to the consumer.” He would 
always reiterate the threat that sugar can be refined in Sydney 
and delivered to New Zealand just as cheaply as being produced 
in Chelsea [EWK to Auckland, 15/4/1908, box 152]. In 1910, CSR 
gave a bonus to all employees, both staff officers and wage earn-
ers. The bonus was given to wage earners who were under the 
award and those whose pay was not subject to an award. This 
was different to the 1905 bonus which only non-award employ-
ees received. EWK stated that the employees under an award 
got the bonus as a reward for not applying to the Arbitration 
Court during the last five years [EWK to Auckland, 22/10/1910, 
box 150]. EWK was responding to changing labor market condi-
tions.
 In 1911, a 5% increase in wages was given to the workers, 
and the company topped up the employees provident fund by 
£10,700 [EWK to Auckland, 31/1/1912, box 152]. However, EWK 
was quick to make the point that these increases in wages were 
driven in part by the extravagant expenditure of government 
money and were not necessarily permanent [EWK to Auckland, 
12/11/1912, box 152]. In addition, EWK instructed the branch 
that “no written announcement is to be made: each man is to 
be told verbally at the pay window if his pay has been raised” 
[EWK to Auckland, 15/4/1911, box 158]. 
 In 1914, the wage award for carpenters was set at 44 hours 
per week. This reduced hours from 47 hours for the same rate of 
pay. Since EWK objected to paying overtime, his solution to the 
issue was to have the men do all the necessary work in the re-
duced time [EWK to Auckland, 7/10/1914, box 152]. The compa-
ny, in response to workers’ requests, gave out a weekly bonus for 
six months in 1915 to offset the unprecedented increase in the 
cost of food in 1915, but the bonus was only given to non-award 
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employees [EWK to Auckland, 12/8/1915, box 152]. In 1916, an 
employee was dismissed for “willfully slowing down in the rate 
of his work.” EWK attributed the “doctrine of slowing down” 
to the IWW. He accused some of the employees at the refinery 
of being contaminated by the IWW which had also happened at 
the Glanville refinery [EWK to Auckland, 1/6/1916 and 5/9/1916, 
box 152]. Union activity had increased greatly in New Zealand 
during the 1900s and had come to a head in 1913 with the Waihi 
miners’ strike and the Wellington watersiders’ strike the next 
year. There was a sense in the 1910s that, after a decade of infla-
tion, New Zealand workers were falling behind other sections of 
society [King, 2003, p. 308]. There was worker discontent with 
the arbitration award system that banned strikes; unions were 
striking more frequently. This climate of employee-employer 
relations entrenched EWK further in his view that the company 
should not negotiate with unions. 
 World War I created a worker shortage for the company, so 
it offered bonuses to induce workers to the refinery. In 1916 and 
again in 1918, the hiring of female labor for bag making, sack 
darning, and syrup packing was considered although nothing 
came of it [EWK to Auckland, 29/11/1916 and 27/2/1918, box 
152]. The bonus for the minimum adult wage was 6/- per week 
in 1916, 9/- per week in 1917, 12/- per week in 1918, 18/- per 
week increased to 22/- per week in 1919, and 26/- in 1920 [Cost 
of Manufacture, 1912-1925, box 114]. Again the bonuses were 
not applied to employees paid under awards. This increase in 
the amount of the bonuses irritated EWK so that in 1916, he 
suggested that the company needed to make a stand against 
further increases in wages without an increase in productivity. 
He further averred, “some of our employees may have thought 
our recent advances have been a sign of weakness, and that we 
would hesitate to be faced with a strike and thereby cut off the 
supply of refined sugar; but, while some inconvenience might be 
caused, actual hardship to the public could be avoided by sup-
plying raw sugar. However, we trust that a position of this kind 
is not likely to arise” [EWK to Auckland, 19/12/1916, box 152]. 
 The company proposed that employees work 11-hour days, 
and that in some areas of the production process, piecework 
rates be considered. However, Chelsea had to recognize that 
labor was scarce and that the workers had the upper hand. 
Some employees started seeking more reasonable conditions, 
such as taking a day (Saturday) off work without pay and want-
ing Christmas a paid holiday. CSR also had to deal with an 
increasing amount of arbitration awards from the Department 
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of Labour over occupation definitions. It was convinced that its 
refined store workers were just sugar workers and should not 
come under the Storeman’s Award [Miller to Department of La-
bour, 23/5/1918, box 150]. The company dealt with the inspector 
of awards, visiting their refinery and classifying their workforce. 
This was intrusive on the company and in a sense the company 
was spoiling for a fight with its workers. CSR objected to the 
increasing power of the employees and the intrusiveness of 
union activity and the arbitration awards. Management started 
writing on industrial peace and how to meet the “evil of indus-
trial discontent.” EWK had the view that “co-operation between 
employer and employed is not to be looked for in the present 
state of human nature” [Miller to Head Office, 18/3/1919, box 
150]. The view of the company was that the workers wanted too 
much and justified this extra amount by Marx’s theory of sur-
plus value. EWK gives a telling insight into his beliefs about his 
fellow man and perhaps why he was so autocratic. He avowed 
that “unless the character and intelligence of the average wage 
earner improves there is little hope of permanent improvement 
in his material condition…but what motive is there for a man 
to improve his character and behaviour if he is firmly convinced 
that his troubles all arise, not from any deficiency in himself, but 
from the unjust actions of other men?” [Miller to Head Office, 
18/3/1919, box 150]. This rhetoric, enmeshed with the account-
ing regime of truth, was a powerful force.
 The company and the workforce were on a collision course. 
In 1920, the employees went on strike over their proposal to 
reduce their hours to 44 per week and increase pay from 74/- to 
94/- per week. The strike was pronounced illegal by the minis-
ter of labour because the union was registered under the 1894 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The company re-
taliated by abolishing the employees’ provident fund. The strike 
lasted 35 days and the Arbitration Court awarded the employees 
a 44-hour week but only a 6/- wage increase. The company did 
not hire back any of the union officers, and when they selected 
the men to return to work, the men were taken to the office and 
had their contributions to the provident fund refunded [Watson, 
1979, pp. 20-23]. 
 The accounting for wages was designed to evade and si-
lence the voice of labor. Yet labor made its voice heard, offer-
ing a different narrative and accounting of its contribution to 
the company without the accounting details the company had 
created. Although labor did not have access to the detailed ac-
counting records of costs and profits of the company, it was not 
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constrained in arguing its case for higher wages. Accounting 
information was not considered as significant a matter when 
dealing with a commodity business like sugar where the inputs 
of raw sugar and the outputs of refined sugar are easily obtained 
[Liberty and Zimmerman, 1986]. This, coupled with a transpar-
ent and well-documented manufacturing process, meant that 
labor was fairly confident of its wage demands despite the lack 
of access to the company’s accounting information. In addition, 
the labor unions were motivated by social justice issues like hu-
man working conditions and livable wages. The alternative voice 
of the union challenged the prevailing accounting orthodoxy of 
CSR.
 After World War I, the company deliberated extensively 
over whether Anzac Day should be included in 1924 as a paid 
holiday as it only wanted to pay for the Picnic Day and Good 
Friday. This attitude to the workers was representative of the 
way the company approached the refinery workforce. Knox was 
outraged by any sniff of union activity and segmented the work-
force through actions like dismissal from the provident fund or 
the employee benefit fund or the granting of loans (advances) 
selectively. EWK did not completely have his way. Labor reap-
propriated its sequestered position through participation in the 
union. Not only did workers protest their repressed position but 
they also sensed moments of empowerment. Fateful moments, 
such as the crisis of an on-the-job accident or mobilizing peri-
ods of union activity, brought times of moral reckoning which 
placed labor outside the economic calculus of the company. 
The workers also appealed to tradition, religion, and national 
pride so they could withdraw from the rigors of their work to 
celebrate holidays such as Christmas and Anzac Day. 
 Chelsea entered into an exclusive supply agreement with the 
New Zealand government from 1917 to 1923 due to sugar’s high 
demand as a staple commodity. These were essentially cost-plus 
contracts. The company became virtually an arm of the govern-
ment much to the surprise of EWK. This situation led to nego-
tiations with the government over selling prices of refined sugar 
so as to enable the company to make a reasonable profit. Prime 
Minster Massey decided in 1923 that the government should no 
longer be the sole buyer of Chelsea sugar. This had become a 
comfortable arrangement for CSR, and the company wondered 
whether it could adjust back to its free-market philosophy. In 
fact, the company concluded that to survive in New Zealand, it 
had to convince the government that a protective duty should 
be applied to all imported sugar if the company was going to 
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be viable. It even co-opted the support of the labor although 
the workforce was suspicious as to why the company needed 
its voice of support. This suspicion was not surprising given the 
history of acrimony with management. The company was able 
to obtain the support of Parliament by working with the Labour 
Party opposition as well as the government of Massey’s Reform 
Party. EWK had retired at this point and was not involved in 




 Accounting reports produce “truth-effects” [Foucault, 1980]. 
This paper provides an examination of domination and auto-
cratic control exercised through two dimensions, the geography 
and ideology of accounting. It demonstrates accounting regimes 
of truth and how the narratives within which accounting is situ-
ated produce domination and exclusion. The sequestration of 
the workers’ experience by the company is an example of such 
domination. Accounting meshed with narratives of power em-
bedded in the autocratic control of CSR’s general manager EWK 
throughout the company. These accounting power plays affected 
the distribution of wealth among workers, salaried employees, 
and shareholders. Accounting thus influenced the managers and 
through them the life of the company, its workers, and society 
as a whole. Accounting information was itself a source of power 
for management in that the way it was used influenced the be-
havior of management and shaped organizational reality. EWK 
was able to exercise his iron fist in a velvet glove of accounting 
reports which produced and imposed a truth which favored the 
shareholders. These truth effects were countered by labor pro-
viding an alternative narrative to be considered. Accounting is a 
contested discipline wrapped up in the organizational regime of 
the production of truth. Thus, the ideology of accounting is sug-
gested to be legitimizing and dominating, diminishing the voice 
of labor in order to maintain the hierarchical, authoritarian cul-
ture of CSR. 
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Letter Knox to Auckland 19/12/1916
Letter Knox to Auckland 27/2/1918
Box 154
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